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SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9-11
Elisa D Harris and John D Steinbruner*
The events of 11 September 2001 and the anthrax letters
have reignited the longstanding debate over scientific
openness and national security.  And for the first time,
the life sciences community is the focus of concern.
Recent proposals for self-governance are unlikely to
provide sufficient reassurance that information, in the
words of the Corson Report, “not directly and
significantly connected with technology critical to
national security” is not disclosed.  A more formalized
system for considering the security implications of
biodefence and other dual-use research, including
specific criteria for making decisions on dissemination
restrictions or classification, is needed in order to
maintain support for the very endeavours on which both
public health and national security depend.
Fear of bioterrorism has emerged as a priority concern of
American security policy as a result of the anthrax letters of
2001.  That event resonating with the September 11 terrorist
attacks crystallized a much more urgent sense of threat than
had previously been perceived.  It is now commonly assumed
that malicious organizations will attempt to exploit the
destructive potential of biotechnology, and it is also implicitly
conceded that a dedicated effort is likely to succeed.1
In response to this surge of fear, the American political
system has sharply increased investment in biodefence
research intended to provide protection against deliberate
biological attack. Nowhere is this more true than at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), which has seen its
funding for biodefence grow by over 3,200%, from $53 million
in fiscal year 2001 to a record $1.8 billion (requested) in
fiscal year 2006.2 These funds have resulted in a 1,500%
increase in the number of grants for research on anthrax,
plague and other top biological warfare agents, from 33
between 1996-2000, to almost 500 between 2001 and January
2005.3  This research is dedicated to determining the character
and magnitude of potential threat in order to develop better
methods of protection. But at least some of this effort will
assuredly identify more advanced methods of attack as well.
That unavoidable fact poses a sharp dilemma and a
fundamental problem of policy.  By its very nature, biodefence
research generates information that the global medical
community has strong reason and arguably an inherent right
to know. Unrestricted dissemination of that information,
however, might inform those dedicated to destruction.
Moreover, as in other areas of technology, it is likely that
offensive applications of biotechnology will prove to be
substantially easier than defensive ones and could therefore
emerge more rapidly in open competition.
In principle, the dilemma might be substantially mitigated
by a new oversight system  under which  sensitive information
vital to public health protection is restricted to those
professionally qualified and explicitly authorized  to have it
and those individuals are in turn monitored to document
responsible use.  Such an arrangement does not exist within
any country or internationally, however, and is not as yet
even being officially discussed.  But for such an arrangement
to be effective at any level, there is a need to devise principles
to guide decisions on whether to restrict or classify
information.  Fortunately, there are useful precedents in that
regard.
Evolving Practice
In the past, all NIH-funded research has been unclassified.
But in October 2001, President Bush signed an Executive
Order extending classification authority to the Department
of Health and Human Services, which includes NIH.  Anthony
Fauci, who heads the NIH institute responsible for biodefence
research, later said that although most NIH-funded research
would remain unclassified, some limitations on access could
not be  ruled out.  “As we move into more research on counter-
bioterrorism,” Fauci said, “we should examine this issue on a
case-by-case basis”.4
By the spring of 2002, it was clear that the Bush
Administration was seriously considering the possibility of
restrictions on the dissemination of scientific findings that
could have national security implications — what has been
called “sensitive but unclassified” information. In a
memorandum to federal agencies in March, White House
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Chief of Staff Andrew Card raised the need to protect sensitive
but unclassified information.5 At the same time, the US
Department of Defense (DOD) circulated a draft directive
containing proposals for new categories of controlled
information and for prepublication review of certain DOD-
funded research, even if it was unclassified.6 Because of
strong criticism from the scientific community, the Pentagon
draft was withdrawn.  However reports continued to emerge
about White House plans to develop rules for the dissemination
of information that could have national security implications.
US scientific organizations moved quickly to minimize the
possibility of government-mandated restrictions on
fundamental research, offering governance by scientists
themselves as an alternative.  In August 2002, the American
Society for Microbiology (ASM), which publishes eleven
leading US peer-reviewed scientific journals, adopted guide-
lines for  handling manuscripts dealing with sensitive
microbiological issues. As part of the traditional peer-review
process, all reviewers were now required to inform the Editor
of any manuscript that contained information on methods or
materials “that might be misused or might pose a threat to
public health safety”.  Any manuscript thus identified would
be held until a decision concerning its disposition had been
rendered by the Editor-in-Chief in consultation with the ASM
Publication Board.7 As Board Chairman Samuel Kaplan later
described it, the goal was to establish a practice for trying to
prevent the publication of information that could be a “clear
and imminent danger to the public”.8  A few months later, the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS)
quietly adopted a similar review process for biological agents
that had been identified by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention as posing the highest security risk.9
By October 2002, the Presidents of the National
Academies of Science were weighing in, declaring in a formal
statement that a balance was needed between the restrictions
necessary to safeguard “strategic secrets” and the openness
required to accelerate the progress of technical knowledge.
The NAS Presidents called upon scientists and policymakers
to work together to develop clear criteria for determining what
information needed to be restricted or classified and how best
to accomplish that task.10
In January 2003, in response to a request from ASM, the
National Academy of Sciences hosted a day-long meeting of
scientists and security experts to begin to explore how to
balance openness and national security.  Scientific journal
editors were generally dismissive of the idea that any research
should be publicly withheld.  But others cautioned that unless
scientists took the lead in defining what was sensitive and
proposing how it could be protected, the government would
act.  If scientists do not take these security concerns seriously,
former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre warned,
politicians with little understanding of science will step in with
“blanket restrictions” that would have “devastating effects
on the conduct of science”.11
The following day, thirty journal editors and scientists agreed
in a signed statement to support the development of new
processes for considering the security implications of proposed
manuscripts and, where necessary, to modify or refrain from
publishing papers whose potential harm outweighed their
potential benefits.  In an editorial accompanying release of
the statement, the PNAS elaborated upon the thinking behind
the effort.  No one would publish a “cookbook recipe” for a
weapon, which would in any event not pass scientific muster.
But it is nearly impossible, the editorial said, to determine in
advance exactly what type of manuscript should not be
published, as any work of value to terrorists would also be of
value in countering terrorism.  For this reason, the journal
editors had focused on developing a common set of publication
policies.12  But as Stanford Professor Stanley Falkow later
pointed out, the journal editors had failed to provide guidance
not only on who exactly would make these publication decisions
but also what information constituted a potential threat.13
Precedents and Possible Guidelines
The need to balance scientific openness and national security
is not a new issue.  As former ASM president Ron Atlas has
noted, since the beginning of modern science in the 1600s,
scientists have confronted questions of secrecy and science.
In an essay in 1626, Sir Francis Bacon observed: “And this
we do also;  we have consultations, which of the inventions
and experiences which we have discovered shall be published,
and which not; and take all an oath of secrecy for the
concealing of those which we think fit to keep secret…”14
During the Cold War, concerns that the Soviet Union had
benefited militarily from access to US scientific and technical
information, especially in computer science and other areas
of the physical sciences, prompted discussions not unlike
today’s about possible restrictions on scientific communication,
including prepublication review by the Pentagon of research
in certain areas relevant to national security.  In response, the
National Academy of Sciences convened an expert panel
under the chairmanship of former Cornell University President
Dale Corson to examine how to balance scientific com-
munication and national security.  The Corson Report, which
was published in 1982, concluded that the national welfare,
including national security, is best served by allowing the free
flow of all scientific and technical information “not directly
and significantly connected with technology critical to national
security”. Accordingly, the report recommended that most
fundamental research at universities should be unclassified;
that a limited amount might require classification; and that a
small grey area could require limited restrictions short of
classification.15
The Reagan Administration accepted the Corson Report
recommendations, embodying them in National Security
Decision Directive189, which stated: “to the maximum extent
possible, the products of fundamental research [shall] remain
unrestricted.... No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct
or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that
has not received national security classification, except as
provided in applicable US Statutes”. NSDD189 defined
fundamental research as “basic and applied research in
science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are
published and shared broadly within the scientific
community…”16
Following the controversy over the Card memo, the
President’s Science Advisor, John Marburger, publicly re-
affirmed the Bush Administration’s commitment to NSDD
189,17 referring to an earlier letter from National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice. “The key to maintaining US tech-
nological preeminence is to encourage open and collaborative
basic research,” Rice wrote in November 2001. “[T]he policy
on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering
information set forth in National Security Decision Directive
189 shall remain in effect, and we will ensure that this policy
is followed.”18
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In addition to upholding the principle of scientific openness,
the Corson Report also outlined criteria for making class-
ification decisions in fundamental research, criteria that could
serve as a model for classification decisions in the life sciences,
including biodefence research, today.  Admittedly, the context
is very different:  the Soviet Union as compared to a much
more diffuse set of national and possibly subnational actors;
the physical sciences as compared to the life sciences. But
no US adversary, much less terrorist group, that exists today
is better capable than the Soviet Union was of adapting
fundamental research results for military purposes. If these
criteria were deemed by the NAS as appropriate to deal with
the Soviet military threat, they should be at least as effective
against the much less sophisticated adversaries we currently
face.
Drawing on the Corson Report, one could establish the
principle that no basic or applied research, including biodefence
research, at university, industry or government labs should be
restricted or classified unless the following criteria are met:
1.  the technology is developing rapidly and time from basic
science to application is short;
2.   the technology has identifiable direct military applications;
or it is dual-use and involves process or production related
technologies;
3.  the transfer of technology would give a BW proliferator
(e.g. a nation-state or subnational group) a significant near-
term military benefit;
4. the US is the only source of information about the
technology, or other nations that could also be the source
have control systems as secure as those in the US; and,
5.   the duration and nature of  the proposed restrictions would
not seriously compromise existing public health practice.
There are two main differences between these criteria
and those outlined in the Corson Report: the term “Soviet
Union” has been replaced by “BW proliferator;” and a fifth
criterion has been added to take account of the public health
implications of any proposed restrictions.
Whether it is possible to identify a more specific list of
fundamental research for which restrictions or classification
is warranted is unclear.  One proposal, in 2003, included the
following examples: alterations in virulence that defeat
vaccine; alterations that greatly accelerate disease course or
delay diagnosis; engineering drug resistance; and, delivery
systems.19 But this and other proposals like it are far too broad,
and would capture a wide swath of fundamental research
critical to future medical, agricultural and other peaceful
applications.
Interestingly, a much more limited approach to the
classification of biodefence  information has been promulgated
by the US Army.  In Army regulation 380-86, dated 1 February
2005, only one area of research is proposed for classification:
the results of medical research revealing operational
deficiencies or vulnerabilities in biological defence. By
comparison, the identity of microorganisms and toxins being
studied, their characteristics, and the consequences of their
administration to appropriate hosts is considered unclassified
information, as is general medical research and procedures
for protecting personnel against biological agents.20
There are sound scientific reasons for avoiding dissem-
ination restrictions or classification in the life sciences, including
in the area of biodefence research.  As the NAS has noted,
none of the research that has been the focus of recent attention
has pointed the way toward the production of biological
weapons in any specific way.  Many additional experimental
steps are required in order to translate basic research results
into a useable biological warfare agent, much less an actual
weapon.21  In addition, as the rapid response to SARS showed,
scientific progress depends upon open communication and
the ability to replicate research and validate results.
Restrictions on the flow of scientific information will under-
mine not only efforts to develop defences against biological
weapons but also to protect the public against the threat from
naturally occurring disease.  New restrictions could also have
a chilling effect on the willingness of scientists to work in
areas in which there are limits on their ability to communicate
with other scientists and to publish their research results.22
There are also compelling security reasons for avoiding
restrictions or classification, especially in the area of
biodefence research. As Mark Wheelis has pointed out,
secrecy about the nature and scope of US biodefence efforts
makes it more difficult for Congress to exercise its oversight
responsibilities and limits opportunities for expert or public
input into the policymaking process. The result could be
policies that fail to address the real threats facing the United
States.  Limits on the dissemination of information about US
biodefence research activities could also raise suspicions about
US intentions to comply with the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), thus leading others to pursue the very
illicit activities the US programme is designed to counter. Lack
of openness on the part of the US could also serve as a
justification for others to be more secretive about their own
purported biodefence activities, thereby complicating US
efforts to detect genuine violations of the BWC.  Finally, limits
on the dissemination of biodefence information denies the US
the deterrent value that comes from an adversary being aware
of the robust nature of US biodefence preparations.23
Many of these arguments are similar to those made in the
1980s by US officials concerned about secrecy at Soviet
biological institutes, including the possibility that Moscow was
using recombinant DNA technology for offensive BW
purposes. At a 1988 roundtable, ACDA official Robert
Mikulak stated that there was “no justification” for secret
biological research labs or classified research.  He also argued
that openness could help reduce suspicions of noncompliance
with the Biological Weapons Convention. At the same meeting,
DOD official Thomas Dashiell argued that by making DOD
biodefence efforts “visible,” the programme could act as a
deterrent to potential adversaries.24
Both Mikulak and Dashiell also disavowed the need for
classified research involving recombinant DNA technology.
“There is no justification for classified military research on
recombinant DNA … anywhere,” Mikulak declared.  Dashiell
agreed, noting that classification was unnecessary because
the relevant work involved “basic science areas” and the
possible application was a number of years away.25
Classification and Oversight Mechanisms
If certain types of fundamental research in the life sciences
are to be reviewed for possible dissemination restrictions or
classification, however limited in scope, how might this best
be pursued?
One possibility would be to rely upon scientific journals to
review manuscripts, as proposed in the February 2003
statement by journal editors and scientists. This is also the
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approach recommended in October 2003 by an expert panel
convened by the National Research Council under the
chairmanship of  MIT professor Gerald Fink.  In their report,
Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, the Fink
Committee argued that “imposing mandatory information
controls on research in the life sciences, if attempted, [would]
be difficult and expensive with little likely gain in genuine
security”.  As a consequence, the Committee recommended
self-governance by scientists and scientific journals to review
publications  for their potential security risks.26
The Fink Committee recognized, however, that scientists
have available to them many other opportunities for sharing
the results of their research efforts short of publication.  This
includes presentations at scientific meetings, Internet postings,
and normal e-mail and other exchanges between scientists
working in similar areas. For this and other reasons, the
Committee called for a concerted effort to educate scientists
about the dual-use nature of biotechnology research. They
also recommended adding seven so-called “experiments of
concern” to the NIH Guidelines, the oversight process which
is to be followed by all academic and other institutions that
receive funding from NIH for recombinant DNA research.
In the view of the Committee, this layered system of self-
governance, involving individual scientists, the local and
national committees responsible for implementing the NIH
Guidelines (known respectively as Institutional Biosafety
Committees and the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee),
and journal publishers, would provide an effective oversight
arrangement. In March 2004, the Bush Administration
announced plans to create a  National Science Advisory Board
for Biosecurity to develop guidelines for implementing these
recommendations.  But the Board, which has yet to be named
or to hold its first meeting, is strictly advisory and both industry
and classified research are formally outside its jurisdiction.27
Another possibility would be to rely upon a more formalized
process for considering potential dissemination restrictions or
classification requirements before funding has been approved
and the research begun. This is the approach enshrined in
NSDD 189, which states: “Each federal government agency
is responsible for … determining whether classification is
appropriate prior to the award of a research grant, contract,
or cooperative agreement”.28  It is also reflected in the
broader oversight proposal we have been developing at the
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland
aimed at preventing advanced research in the life sciences
from being applied, either inadvertently or deliberately, for
destructive purposes.29
Under our proposed oversight system, all proposals in
certain clearly defined research areas would go through a
peer review process in which the potential scientific, medical,
or other benefits are weighed against the potential security
risks.  Consideration would be given not only to whether and
under what conditions the proposed research should proceed
but also the possible need for restrictions on the dissemination
of the research results, including through classification. This
peer review process would be applied comprehensively to all
relevant institutions, whether government, industry or
academic. This is in contrast to the Fink Committee approach,
which formally would apply only to academic or other
institutions that are subject to the NIH Guidelines. Thus,
neither industry nor government biodefence programs, which
the Fink Committee singled out as raising particular dual-use
concerns, would be required to adhere to its proposed rules.
To encourage compliance with our oversight system and
adequate funding for its implementation, the obligations would
be mandatory, unlike the Fink Committee approach, which
relies on the voluntary compliance of scientists with the NIH
Guidelines.  And consistent with the globally distributed nature
of the research itself, our system would seek to establish
uniform procedures and rules among all participating countries.
The Fink Committee recommendations, by comparison, apply
only to the United States, although the Committee acknow-
ledged in its report that only internationally harmonized stand-
ards would minimize the risk of misuse of dual-use research.
Like the NIH Guidelines, our oversight system would be
tiered, with the level of risk of the proposed research
determining the nature and extent of the oversight
requirements. At the foundation would be a local review body,
responsible for overseeing and approving what we call
potentially dangerous research activities, particularly those
that increase the potential for otherwise benign pathogens to
be used for destructive purposes. This local oversight body
would be similar to the existing Institutional Biosafety
Committees, though better resourced, both financially and in
terms of dedicated personnel.30  The vast majority of research
would fall into this category or not be affected at all.
At the next level there would be a national review body,
which would be responsible for overseeing and approving what
we call moderately dangerous research activities, particularly
those that would enhance the weaponization potential of
pathogens or toxins that already have been identified as posing
a security threat. This national oversight body would be similar
to the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee.
At the top would be a global implementing body, which
would be responsible for overseeing and approving the most
dangerous research activities, especially research that involves
or could result in the creation of pathogens significantly more
dangerous than those that currently exist. The closest
precedent for this would be the WHO Advisory Committee
on Variola Virus Research, which oversees and approves all
smallpox virus research conducted in the USA and Russia,
the only countries authorized to retain the virus following its
successful eradication in nature.
If the relevant peer review body determined that the results
of a particular research project needed to be restricted, every
effort would be made to share the restricted information with
other scientists with a legitimate need-to-know.  One model
for this is the process that was used by the NAS to allow
limited access to certain portions of its 2002 study on
agricultural bioterrorism. In response to security concerns from
the Department of Agriculture, which funded the study, NAS
officials developed guidelines for the types of individuals who
could be given access to the controlled information.  Anyone
interested had to submit a written request and be interviewed
by NAS staff before being provided a copy of the controlled
information.31  It might also be possible to use a secure,
password-controlled website to make controlled information
available to those who have been vetted and found to have a
legitimate need for access to the information.32
Clearly, the success of an oversight system like that
described above depends very heavily on the willingness of
the scientific community to help develop and implement the
procedures and rules that are at the heart of the system. But
security experts will also be critical to the peer review process,
especially at the national level, where most biodefence
research proposals likely would be vetted.  Security clearances
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may be necessary for some or all of the individuals that serve
on the national oversight body. Nondisclosure agreements,
with appropriate penalties for violations, could also be used to
help prevent unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information.
And at every level, independent scientists and security experts,
without a vested interest in the outcome of the review process,
would be required to help ensure the integrity of the overall
system.
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The major event during the period under review was the thirty-
ninth session of the Executive Council, which met for only
one day, 14 December 2004. Libya’s combined plan for con-
version and verification of the chemical weapons production
facilities (CWPFs) Rabta Pharmaceutical Factories 1 and 2
(phase II) was approved, along with several facility agree-
ments for on-site inspections at the Category 2 Al-Jufra
chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF), Ruwagha
chemical weapons storage facility (CWSF), CWPF Tripoli
STO-001 and for the Rabta Pharmaceutical Factories. In
addition, it was reported on 31 January that a change to Part
V of the Verification Annex to the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (the Convention or CWC) had been adopted. This
change, further to a request by Libya, removes a procedural
block in order to permit states parties joining the Convention
after 29 April 2003 to convert former CWPFs for purposes
not prohibited under the Convention.
Implementation of the Article VII action plan has become
one of the Organisation’s overriding concerns this year and
the pace of activity will continue to gain speed in advance of
the tenth session of the Conference of the States Parties
where further steps will be taken on this matter, if necessary.
Thirty-ninth Session of the Executive Council
The Executive Council met for its thirty-ninth session on 14
December and was chaired by José Antonio Arróspide of
Peru.
The Vice-Chairmen and coordinators for clusters of issues
reported to the Council on informal consultations during the
intersessional period as follows: Benchaâ Dani of Algeria, on
chemical weapons issues; Mustafa Kamal Kazi of Pakistan
on chemical industry and other Article VI issues; Marc Th.
Vogelaar of the Netherlands on administrative and financial
issues; and Kirill Gevorgian of Russia on legal, organisational,
and other issues. The Chairman reported on his activities on
behalf of the Council during the intersessional period.
The Director-General began his opening statement to the
last regular session of the Council for 2004 by expressing
gratitude and satisfaction with the work of the OPCW and its
the programme and budget for 2005. Mr Pfirter noted that
the Council’s relevant recommendations and suggestions re-
garding the budget will guide the Secretariat’s work on the
one for 2006.
Turning to verification, the Director-General observed that
several decisions were before the Council including ones
deferred from the previous session as well as decisions relating
to facility agreements with Libya and a CWDF in India. Mr
Pfirter discussed Libya’s preparations for the destruction of
its Category 1 weapons and noted that destruction of its Cate-
gory 2 weapons would begin in December. It was noted by
the Director-General that nearly three times as much lewisite
is being destroyed now at Unit 1 of the Gorny CWDF due to
a technical modification in the destruction process. Mr Pfirter
also remarked that 48 per cent of the stockpile of a state
party of withheld identity has now been destroyed. In respect
of optimisation, Mr Pfirter observed that, in the United States,
optimisation of verification is underway at the Anniston
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility, including the successful
completion of its first round of munitions destruction under an
optimisation trial. He added that optimisation at a CWDF in
India is being discussed and that talks are also underway with
Russia, including discussions on the possible optimisation of
verification activities at the future CWDFs in Kambarka and
Maradikovsky.
With regard to international cooperation, the Director-
General noted that recent events were held in Argentina,
Bangladesh, Kenya, Singapore, and Uruguay under the
OPCW’s Conference Support Programme. Particular
attention was drawn to the Fourth Singapore International
Symposium on Protection against Toxic Substances, which
Mr Pfirter attended, held in Singapore during 6-10 December.
The Director-General also observed that 15 projects were
sponsored in 2004 in several states parties with developing
economies under the Programme for Support of Research
Projects. In respect of assistance and protection, Mr Pfirter
expressed his satisfaction with the adoption of a decision by
the Conference on the format for submission of information
about national protection programmes. Brief mention was also
made of the upcoming ASSISTEX 2 to be held in Ukraine.
National capacity-building was discussed by the Director-
General, including thirteen courses for first responders in as
